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Hospital Energy Resilience
Katerina Vichova and Martin Hromada
Abstract
Many emergencies and crises threaten the whole world. These affect not only 
the lives, health, and property of citizens but also the subjects and elements of the 
critical infrastructure itself. Breaking the critical infrastructure system would have 
a severe impact on the state’s security, securing the basic living needs of the popula-
tion, the health of the people, or the economy of the country. One of the significant 
sectors of the critical infrastructure is undoubtedly healthcare. It is vital for the 
health service to be able to perform its function, even in times of crisis. The crisis 
of naturogenic character ordinarily has the so-called cascade effect, which causes 
other extraordinary events and crises. An example of this may be windstorm, 
resulting in a power outage. A significant impact of the power supply outage in 
healthcare is observed in hospitals. There is currently no assessment tool to set the 
hospital’s readiness for a power outage. The aim of the chapter is to analyze the 
current state of the crisis preparedness of the hospital.
Keywords: power outage, hospital, energy supply, critical infrastructure,  
emergency management
1. Introduction
Many extraordinary events and crises threaten the whole world. There were 281 
disasters and 61.7 million people were affected by the natural disaster in 2018 in the 
whole world (based on the International Disaster Database). Next, there were about 
1600 storms in 2018. These disasters often cause the power outage. These affect not 
only the lives, health, and property of citizens but also the subjects and elements of 
the critical infrastructure itself. Naturogenic or anthropogenic threats could cause 
it. The aim of each state is to protect its citizens and the necessary infrastructure of 
the country where systems called critical infrastructure can be considered. Breaking 
the critical infrastructure system would have a severe impact on the state’s security, 
securing the basic living needs of the population, the health of the people, or the 
economy of the country. However, the critical infrastructure system must be viewed 
comprehensively [1].
There are many sectors of the critical infrastructure (see Figure 1).
In some cases, the disruption of the critical infrastructure has an impact on the 
next system. Rinaldi called this as the cascade effects [3]. Next, Rehak examined the 
cascade effects in the critical infrastructure system [4].
As with any network, a critical infrastructure system has elements with different 
levels of importance (criticality). The damage, disruption, or failure of an important 
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Figure 2. 
Critical infrastructure system [4].
Figure 1. 
Critical infrastructure sectors [2].
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(critical) element has a more or less serious impact based on the number and charac-
ter of linkages that define its level of effect, dependence, or interdependence [4].
The crisis of naturogenic character ordinarily has which causes other emer-
gency — it could be called cascade effect (see Figure 2). An example of this may be 
windstorm, resulting in a power outage. One of the most critical risks for modern 
science is a large scale power system blackout [5]. Over the decade, electricity plays 
a major role in the modern day life. Even a momentary power outage can create 
chaos, revenue loss, and loss of life [6].
It is clear from the list of sectoral criteria that the health sector is also essential 
for maintaining the state’s security and maintaining the functioning of the country. 
Here, it is necessary to mention the interconnection of critical infrastructure ele-
ments. Just breaking the essential element of infrastructure—power outage could 
result in a cascade effect, namely healthcare.
The aim of the chapter is to analyze the current state of the crisis preparedness 
of the hospital.
2. Power outage
As has already been noted, naturogenic emergencies and crises may also result in 
further indications. One of them is a power outage (in some countries we can also 
find the term blackout). In the Czech Republic, this threat is frequently described 
as the failure of large-scale electricity supplies, but sometimes we can also find the 
term “blackout” [7, 8]. In English literature, we can find a replacement for the term 
“power outage”. The term blackout is defined as a total power outage in a large area 
[9]. Furthermore, this term refers to the moment when the balance between the 
production and consumption of electricity has been violated, and the security of 
supply is undermined [7].
Power outage affects not only the lives of people but also the operation of the 
whole state, especially the economic development of the affected area. The par-
ticular feature of the blackout is that the secondary consequences of the outage are 
many times greater than the effects on the plants for the production, transmission, 
and distribution of electricity. The cause of this is dominoes that arise from the 
interconnection of the entire critical infrastructure [8].
It is a predictable factor that causes disturbances on the transmission or distribu-
tion system. In this case, the account is also taken of historical events where a power 
outage was caused mainly by the wind storm. This event could create a cascade 
effect when one cause gradually raises a series of related events.
Also, the failure of the power supply may be caused by a technical fault. 
Disturbances, such as transformer fire, can occur both at the power generation 
points and directly in the transmission and distribution system. If a combination of 
several serious faults occurs, a significant power outage may occur.
Among other causes, we could include the human factor. In case of concurrence 
of several negative influences, dispatchers may erroneously assess the situation that 
may result in a significant power outage. Such conditions are prevented mainly by 
professionally qualified service personnel and by creating a comprehensive set of 
safety rules. From the analysis of available data, it is clear that even a terrorist attack 
may also be a cause of failure. The attack could be made directly, for example, by 
the destruction of the transformer station, or it could be done through information 
networks, called the cyberattack.
Finally, there may also be a significant over-flow of energy from foreign grids. 
An example may be the transport of electricity from power plants in northern 
Germany to the sampling centers in the southern parts of Germany through the 
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transmission system of the Czech Republic. In the event of a sudden increase in 
electricity production, along downtime could occur.
Act No. 458/2000 Coll., on business conditions and the execution of state admin-
istration in the energy sector and on the amendment of some laws (Energy Act), indi-
cates that an emergency may occur in the electricity grid. A state of emergency means 
a condition resulting from natural disasters; measures taken by the state authorities 
for an emergency, a state of state threat, or a state of war; accidents or cumulation of 
failures in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution facilities; smog situ-
ations according to special regulations; terrorist attack; unbalanced electricity grid 
balances or parts thereof; transmission of a fault from a foreign electricity system; 
when physical or personal safety is at risk and causes significant and sudden electric-
ity shortages or threats to the integrity of the power system, its security, and reliability 
in the whole territory of the state, the significant territory or part thereof [10].
Although the company has relied on electricity infrastructure since the early 
twentieth century, the increasing complexity of infrastructure and its interdepen-
dence with other infrastructures such as information and communication technolo-
gies makes it more vulnerable. Even if the electricity supply outage is rare, it will 
occur more frequently and for a more extended period (the result of naturogenic 
crisis caused by climate change) [11].
Due to the sophisticated security system, the most likely cause of a major power 
outage is overlapping several primary reasons at one time. Due to the cause of 
the power supply outage, the rate of renewal of supplies also develops. If there is 
marked physical damage to the infrastructure, the recovery time will be propor-
tional to the extent of the damage—in days to weeks [12].
Based on the fact that today’s world is dependent on electricity, which is used 
in all areas of life, the power supply outage may have significant consequences. It 
could, therefore, be assumed that the power outage will occur in all areas—health, 
public transport, supply, restriction, or interruption of drinking water, gas, heat, 
outages of mobile operators, Internet network failure, public safety, etc.
2.1 History of the power outage in the world
The whole world is struggling with power outages that last for a variety of periods, 
affecting states or parts of them, and hence different populations. Power outages are 
widespread in Asia; however, the low level of robustness of the energy network is 
taken into account. Nevertheless, even developed countries do not avoid these events, 
as a cascading effect of an ever increasing number of emergencies and crises.
The northeastern portion of the US and the southeastern part of Canada hit an 
extensive power outage in 2003. In total, about 50 million people were affected, and 
in some places, a state of emergency was declared. The cause of this outage was the 
interconnected problems mentioned. It is said to have been the neglect of main-
tenance of vegetation along backbone power lines, the inability to detect network 
problems and communication with neighboring power systems, inadequate train-
ing of dispatchers, and lack of backup systems.
This power outage resulted in several events. It was a failure of the mobile 
telephone network due to overloading by a massive number of calls and a lack of 
energy to charge mobile phones. Mobile network reliability proved to be quite low 
and unreliable in a crisis. In some places, there has been a drop in pressure in the 
water pipes, and there is a risk of the entry of dangerous substances and organisms 
into the water. The electrified lines were out of service throughout the downtime in 
the USA. In chemical operation, 140 kg of poisonous vinyl chloride was leaked into 
the river, and some had to be hospitalized. The mines were trapped by miners who 
evacuated after the resumption of electricity supplies.
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In the same year, Italy and Switzerland suffered a significant power outage. It 
affected about 56 million people. Again, these were cumulative causes that resulted 
in a significant power outage. The backbone line between Switzerland and Italy 
was heavily overloaded, and there was a shortage of surrounding vegetation. The 
operators had 10–15 min to solve this situation, which they could not solve. After 
the failure of the second backbone line, there was a cascade effect and the interrup-
tion of all other lines [7].
The following table shows the history of the significant power outage in the 
whole world (see Table 1).
Table 1 shows the significant power outage from 1998 to 2015. As can be seen, 
the largest population without electricity was in 2012 in India. This outage hit 670 
million of the inhabitants.
2.2 History of the power outage in the Czech Republic
Even though the Czech Republic is using efficient instruments of crisis manage-
ment in the electricity sector, its requirement ever is taken into account that this 
event may occur. After the devastating storm Kyrill in 2007 and Emma in 2008, we 
The date of the 
power outage
Country Cause Inhabitants 
without 
electricity 
(millions)
31/03/2015 Turkey The shutdown of two power plants and 
simultaneous maintenance on transmission 
lines (not confirmed)
70
26/10/2012 Brazil Fire in the substation 53
30/07/2012–
31/07/2012
India The gap between production and dynamically 
growing consumption (overloaded lines), 
which has been momentarily exacerbated by 
unfavorable climatic conditions
670
08/09/2011 USA and 
Mexico
Operator error and consequent failure of the 
high voltage line
3
11/03/2011 Japan The decommissioning of nuclear power plants, 
after their damage to the tsunami caused by 
the earthquake
4.4
28/1/2008 China The snowstorm destroyed the very high 
voltage line
30
11/11/2009 Brazil, 
Paraguay, and 
Uruguay
Short circuit of three transformers due to 
heavy rains
60
18/08/2005 Indonesia 
(Java Islands 
and Bali)
Multiple EC failure to eliminate 2700 MW of 
the power
100
27/09/2003–
28/09/2003
Italy Storm 56
14/8/2003 USA and 
Canada
Short branches of the tree and consequently a 
weak solution to these initiation faults
50
20/02/1998–
27/03/1998
New Zealand Repeated failures on the high voltage cables 1
Table 1. 
History of the power outage in the world [author].
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must admit that [13]. In this respect, critical infrastructure equipment is a back-up 
powerhouse with its fuel supply, which is capable of covering the consumption of 
essential offices, hospitals, etc. [7]. Hospitals are a critical infrastructure sector 
where it is necessary to operate as soon as possible restored.
The failure to supply electricity of the same magnitude as the one mentioned in 
the world has not yet been recorded in the Czech Republic. There were only local 
power outages or power line interruptions. These are several, frequently caused by 
extraordinary events and crises of a natural character.
On the verge of the power outage was the power industry declared an emergency 
on 24 July 2006 in the Czech Republic. It was not a typical power outage regarding a 
fatal impact on the consumer—no households have been interrupted by the supply 
of electricity in the Czech Republic. However, due to the announced regulatory 
levels, large consumers have had to limit their collection [14]. The reason for this 
outage was the previous rupture between the Hradec and Etzenricht substation. 
This line was replaced, but on July 24, when the substation was re-connected to an 
unexpected outage at the Diviča substation, this increased the demand from the 
Czech Republic to Austria. The cascade effect then caused further outages [14].
Another reported power outage, this time with an impact on the population, had 
a cause in the Kyrill storm, which was moved across Western and Central Europe 
and also hit the Czech Republic in 2007. The CEZ Energy Group has declared a state 
of emergency in the Czech Republic as a result of this storm. Due to the conse-
quences of the wind turbine, 27 percent of CEZ Group supply points were found 
without electricity, which includes more than a million households. This condition 
was caused mainly by the fall of trees and branches into power line, thunderstorm, 
and other weather influences [15].
Emma was struck by Europe and the Czech Republic a year later. Again, it 
caused the fall of trees to power lines, which resulted in up to 920,000 households 
without electricity. The Herwart storm came as a result of the fall of trees to 
power lines in the Czech Republic 10 years after Emma’s. CEZ Group has declared 
a calamity situation in eight regions. Without electricity, there were 500,000 
subscribers. CEZ Group registered approximately 14,000 households without 
electricity [16].
There was also an intense storm of Fabianne in 2018. This storm caused power 
outages, primarily because of the trees grabbed on the line. There were 160,000 
households without electricity.
From the history of large-scale power supply outages, it can be observed that the 
greatest cascade effects caused by naturogenic phenomena have the greatest effect 
on the outage.
2.3 Power outage in the hospitals
This part of the chapter deals with the history of power supply outages with 
impact toward the hospitals. A list of selected events according to the time horizon 
in selected parts of the world is presented.
An earthquake hit the islands of Lombok and Bali in Asia in July and August 
2018. During this disaster, 98 people died. The earthquake intensity was on the 
seventh Richter scale. This catastrophe has caused landslides and as a consequence 
of the downstream cascade effect, power outage [17]. The main hospital in Tanjung 
in the north was critically damaged and evacuated. Employees prepared a provi-
sional hospital—about 30 beds were in the shade of the trees and in the tent on the 
playground to have a place to treat the wounded. Other hospitals were overcrowded, 
and some patients were treated in car parks [18].
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Tropical storm Leslie hit Europe in 2018. This storm hit mainly the southern part 
of Europe. The most affected were Portugal, France, Spain, and the island state of 
Mallorca. The storm caused a flash flood in these states. The hospitals were flooded, 
and thousands of people in France were evacuated. A similar situation was also in 
Portugal, which was also hit by flash floods [19].
Another was the Irma Hurricane in the US. It was the strongest hurricane in the 
Atlantic in recorded history. The storm arrived on the Barbuda coast in September 
2017. Its wind speed was 185 miles per hour for 37 hours. More than 10 million 
people have stayed in Florida without electricity. More than 5 million Florida 
residents were evacuated [20]. Some hospitals were affected by Hurricane Irma. 
Hospital staff decided to dismiss patients who were able to be in home care. Other 
patients had to be evacuated to other hospitals. In some hospitals, urgent income 
has been interrupted.
Hurricane Sandy arrived on the US coast in October 2012. It was a post-tropical 
cyclone. The Hurricane began as a tropical wave in the Caribbean and quickly, in 
just 6 hours, turned into a tropical storm. It turned into a hurricane during October 
24th. The total deaths reached 285, including 125 deaths in the United States. 
Hurricane caused damage of $ 62 billion and $ 315 million in the Caribbean. More 
than 7.5 million people were without electricity [21].
Hurricane Sandy caused floods to hit hospitals, causing power outages in 
New York. Five hospitals were forced to evacuate patients. The evacuation was also 
required due to power outages. Other hospitals were evacuated due to the flood of 
cellars. The aggregates that were placed here ceased to work.
These events are just a selection of some naturogenic disasters that have had an 
impact on the hospitals. A naturogenic disaster did not cause the following power 
outage. It was a power outage that lasted for 6 weeks in 1998. The city of Auckland 
was hit in New Zealand. A technical failure caused this outage. The initial assump-
tions of the downtime were for 1 week and then the estimates of the energy com-
pany’s employees were specified per month. The number of banking data centers, 
stock exchanges, central city offices, customs and immigration, inland revenue, 
internal affairs, social care, Auckland City Council, central police, significant 
hospitals, University campus and technical institute, television and radio stations, 
hotels, and more was affected. Although many of these buildings have generators, 
various switching failures have caused problems and subsequent outages. Some 
institutions have tackled a power failure by purchasing aggregates from Australia or 
Poland [22].
The Czech Republic has not met the failure of electricity supply with the impact 
to the hospitals of such magnitude.
3. Crisis management and healthcare
As mentioned above, the security threats to the Czech Republic, but also the 
whole world have the character of naturogenic or anthropogenic. These may result 
in the power outage.
Act No. 458/2000 Coll. regulates energy in the crisis (Energy Act) and the 
decrees of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Decree No. 80/2010 Coll., Decree 
No. 344/2012 Coll., Decree No. 225/2001 Coll.). Electricity for the population will 
be delivered according to the appropriate level of regulation, tripping, and fre-
quency plan based on the specific situation [10].
The Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic is responsible for crisis manage-
ment in health care. To that purpose, a crisis preparedness workplace is set up [23]. 
Infrastructure Management and Construction
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The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms states that everyone has the right 
to health protection. Citizens have the right to free healthcare and medical aid by 
public (health) insurance under the conditions laid down by law [24].
The Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic states that its role in crisis man-
agement is to ensure framework conditions for the provision of health care at the 
crisis by creating and enforcing state health policy [25].
Crisis preparedness in the health sector is defined as the ability of health care 
providers, and health care facilities to provide essential health care to the popula-
tion locally relevant to administrative unit for emergency and crisis in the continu-
ity of medical policy for the provision of health care by qualified personnel [25].
In the introduction of the chapter, the impact of crises on state security and 
threats to its infrastructures was mentioned. This subchapter describes crisis 
management in the hospitals.
Healthcare facilities are spaces for the provision of health services [26]. 
However, this concept includes not only hospitals but also therapeutic institutions, 
spa health facilities, general practitioners, and others.
For this research, a healthcare facility—a hospital was selected. A hospital is a 
medical facility licensed to provide health care, has many beds, an organized medical 
team of the requisite qualification, and offers continuous nursing services. Hospitals 
are divided by the number of beds to small (up to 700 beds) and large. They can also 
be classified by type of ownership into hospitals owned and administered by the 
state, public hospitals administered by regions, towns and municipalities, private 
hospitals or nonprofit hospitals, and hospitals based on a business principle [27].
The term healthcare is also defined, which can be considered a multidisciplinary 
field. Healthcare is modern medicine that represents a complex process that accu-
mulates human knowledge from a wide range of disciplines, not just science, but 
also technical and social sciences. The collected data and acquired knowledge are 
thus used both for theoretical and scientific purposes, that is, for the development 
of the discipline as an academic discipline, as well as for the practical decisions of 
both political and managerial disciplines [28]. From the above definitions of health 
care, it is evident that there are also other disciplines, one of which is also computer 
science. It interferes with healthcare not only in the form of electronic patient cards 
but primarily as a national health register. Nowadays, information support for crisis 
management is also being used. The objective of information support is to simplify, 
streamline, and accelerate crisis management with the help of information systems.
As has been mentioned, healthcare is a multidisciplinary field, which also 
involves other interests. This work attempts to connect three branches, namely 
health, informatics, and crisis management.
4. Critical infrastructure and healthcare
As mentioned above, the objective of each state is to protect its citizens and the 
basic infrastructures of the country where systems called critical infrastructure 
can be considered. Disruption of a critical infrastructure system would have a 
significant impact on state security, the security of the basic living needs of the 
population, the health of people, or the state’s economy. The Czech Republic defines 
industry criteria for identifying industries, sub-sectors, and critical infrastructure 
elements. Healthcare is also one of the critical sectors of critical infrastructure.
With the increasing insertion of new information and communication technolo-
gies into all areas of life, resource consumption, and the maintenance of living 
standards, new threats arise not only for individuals but also for the economy, the 
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state, and society. Threats can arise from not only organized groups and terrorist 
and criminal organizations, but also manifestations of hostilities of countries, 
natural disasters, or competing struggles for necessary raw materials. Specific area 
of society’s life more dependent on, critically reliant on another area, the more 
severely the infrastructure sector is causing the functionality or limitation of the 
feature of a particular sector [29]. Government Regulation No. 432/2010 Coll. 
criteria for identifying critical infrastructure elements were introduced in the Czech 
Republic. This government regulation divides the criteria into cross-cutting and 
sectoral. Sectoral criteria are defined by the following sectors:
• energy,
• water,
• food and agriculture,
• health,
• transport,
• communication and information systems,
• financial market and currency,
• emergency services, and
• public administration [30].
It is clear from the list of sectoral criteria that the health sector is also essential 
for maintaining the state’s security and maintaining the state’s functionality. It 
should be noted that this is a hospital with a total number of acute beds of at least 
2500. However, no condition is fulfilled by any hospital in the Czech Republic.
Because of the need to cope with the crisis in hospitals, it is essential that 
hospital emergency care must be implemented. In this case, it should be noted that 
the critical infrastructure referred to is directed to healthcare. In healthcare, as in 
other areas, eight critical areas are defined (see Table 2). In healthcare, they have 
their specific features and commodities. All of them are essential for healthcare, 
and their activities are under crisis management [31].
1. Electricity, gas, and fuel
2. Supply—drugs, lingerie, food, and water
3. IT—medical documentation, internal contact, and contact with superiors and other external 
organizational units
4. Management
5. Transport of persons and materials—medical and supportive
6. Insurance and finance—sharing personnel, health service, and costs
7. Special substances—medicines, artificial nutrition, and special and basic medical supplies
Table 2. 
Critical area of the hospital [31].
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5. Supply of healthcare facilities at the time of power outage
Czech Standard ČSN 33 2140 entered into force on electrical wiring in rooms 
for medical purposes in 1987. This ČSN was valid until 2015. Subsequently, ČSN 33 
2000-7-710 was introduced for low-voltage electrical installations; part 7-710 deals 
with special-purpose devices in particular premises—medical areas. It should be 
noted that this current ČSN is valid for newly built medical facilities.
For medical premises, a power source must be installed which, in the event of a 
faulty mains supply, for a specified period and at a predetermined switch-over time, 
provides power to devices divided by a power source with different switching times.
Power supplies with a switching time of up to 0.5 s including—in the event of a 
voltage failure on one or more phase wires in a switchboard, a power supply must 
be used to provide power to illumination of operating tables and another necessary 
lighting, such as endoscopes, at least after 3 h, and the resumption of voltage must 
be within 0.5 s [32].
Power supplies with a switching time of up to 15 s—safety lighting and other 
devices (see below) must be connected within 15 s to a power source capable of sup-
plying power for at least 24 h when the voltage on one or more mains power supply 
mains security purposes will be reduced to less than 90% of the nominal value for 
more than 3 s [32].
Power supplies with a switching time of more than 15 s—power supplies for 
other electrical equipment of medical equipment that do not meet the requirements 
listed above and are required for health services may be connected to the power 
supply automatically or manually. This power supply must be capable of delivering 
power for at least 24 h. These electrical devices can be sterilizing devices; building 
equipment such as heating or air conditioning, ventilation, building, and waste 
disposal facilities; cooling device; kitchen furnishings; and battery chargers [32].
Lightning escape routes are considered as safety lighting; illumination of exit 
signs; all wiring (including switchboards with main switchboards) of rooms with 
safety and additional safety sources; rooms where essential services are provided; 
group 1 healthcare facilities; and group 2 medical facilities [32].
Among other devices, we can include selected fire lifts; ventilation systems 
for smoke extraction; people search systems; medical electrical appliances used 
in group 2 medical areas which are intended for surgical or other applications 
of vital importance; electrical devices for the delivery of medical gases, includ-
ing compressed air, vacuum supply, and anesthetic gas discharge system, as 
well as their monitoring devices; and fire detection, fire alarm, and fire extin-
guishing systems.
This standard provides a classification of safety circuits for healthcare facilities 
(see Table 3).
Class Interruption
Class 0—without interruption Power is provided automatically without interruption
Class 0.15—very short interruption Power supply automatically up to 0.15 s
Class 0.5—short interruption Power supply automatically up to 0.5 s
Class 5—normal interruption Power supply automatically up to 5 s
Class 15—middle interruption Power supply automatically up to 15 s
Class >15—long interruption Power is automatically provided for more than 15 s
Table 3. 
Classification for the interruption [32].
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The classification of importance may vary for each site. In this case, the highest 
safety requirement obligation is taken. It is possible to refer to the following table 
(Annex B of the ČSN), which contains the classification of healthcare facilities 
regarding safety circuits (see Table 4).
Table 4 shows the classification of healthcare facilities by group. The author 
considers the operating rooms, the postoperative room, intensive care units, the 
delivery room, and the premise for premature babies to be the essential premises 
regarding electricity supply.
Hospitals are among healthcare facilities whose rapid and efficient services play 
an essential role in reducing disaster mortality rates [33]. A critical part of crisis 
management is the search for and mitigation of the risks to the population, depend-
ing on assistance and care in the healthcare facilities [34].
Therefore, hospitals should be designed and built to be able to deal effectively 
with all kinds of crises [35]. One of the problems of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) is the disaster preparedness of the hospitals [36]. There is still no standard 
and valid tool for assessing disaster preparedness in the hospitals [37]. Disaster 
managers need accurate and useful tools to assess disaster preparedness for 
Medical area Group Class
0 1 2 ≤0.5 s >0.5 s ≤ 15 s
Massage room X X X
Bed room X X
The birth hall X X X
ECG, EEG, and EHG room X X
Endoscopy X X X
Investigation room or nursing room X X X
Urology X X X
Radiological room X X
Hydrotherapy X X
Physiotherapy X X
Anesthesia X X X
Operating room X X X
Operational preparation room X X X
Operational gypsum room X X X
Postoperative room X X X
Catheterization room X X X
Intensive care room X X X
Angiography X X X
Hemodialysis X X
Magnetic resonance X X X X
Nuclear medicine X X
Room for premature babies X X X
Intermediate care unit X X X
Table 4. 
Medical room and their classification [32].
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hospitals. However, there is no standardized and comprehensive instrument for 
this purpose [38]. Based on the authors’ quotations and the analysis carried out, 
it can be stated that there is still no evaluation system to determine the hospital’s 
preparedness for the crisis.
6. Methodology
In this chapter, four scientific methods were used. Firstly, it was the analysis, 
which we used for the analysis of the hospitals. Secondly, the method comparison was 
used, which compares the results from the analysis. Thirdly, the induction method 
was used, where this method serves to examine the fact of creating a hypothesis from 
the points obtained. Finally, the heuristic analysis of the preparedness was used.
The heuristic analysis of the preparedness was developed for the evaluation of 
the hospitals. Based on this assessment, we will get an accurate idea of the weak-
nesses and strengths of the assessed hospitals.
This analysis was divided into four categories. The hospitals were assessed from 
the point of view—emergency water supply, emergency food supply, emergency 
energy supply, and other emergency supply.
Emergency power supply—this category evaluates the preparedness of the hos-
pitals for emergency energy supplies—the ownership of energy supply replacement 
units. However, these aggregates are fuel-dependent, and it is, therefore, necessary 
to assess fuel supply to the hospital. It deals with the area of contractual fuelling, its 
gas station, etc.
Based on the above analysis, an assessment was performed using Eq. (1):
  HP =   (R + H)  ______
2 × H
 × 100% (1)
where HP is hospital preparedness, R is sum of results (obtained points), and H 
is the number of assessed heuristics.
The evaluation methodology consisted in assigning a response to each question 
answered in the form of valuation from a predefined set of values (−1 = does not 
agree, 1 = agree; 0 = partly agree, and blank field if the problem is not relevant).
7. Results
This part of the chapter is focused on assessing the crisis preparedness of the 
hospitals in the area of emergency energy supply.
The assessment method was proposed—heuristic analysis of the preparedness. 
This analysis was used for assessing 13 hospitals in the Czech Republic. The Czech 
Republic is divided into 14 regions. Each region has a different number of hospitals. 
As a rule, each region has one faculty hospital. However, there are exceptions; for 
example, the Zlín Region does not have a faculty hospital. There is only a regional 
hospital. There are also district hospitals, private hospitals, and specialized hospi-
tals. The evaluated hospitals were from five regions in the Czech Republic. Based on 
the mentioned introduction of this paper, the focus is on emergency energy supply. 
The following figure shows the results of the 13 hospitals (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 shows the emergency energy supply of the hospitals in the Czech 
Republic. There is a differentiation of the emergency energy supply of the hospi-
tals. As can be seen, the best-evaluated hospital from the point of view is South 
Moravian Hospital 1. On the other hand, the worst evaluated hospital is in Central 
Bohemian Region 1. The type of hospital could cause this differentiation.
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It was in the readiness of the hospitals to make sure that we saw the supply of 
electricity and that we saw significant differences. And this fact enabled us to define 
the primary aim of our research and this chapter.
Each hospital has to deal with the external issue of emergency fuel stocks 
to address individually. There is currently no valid legislation to ensure this. 
Some hospitals address this situation through a contractual agreement with fuel 
suppliers (ČEPRO or other contractors); other hospitals own a gas station where 
they have sufficient supplies even for a more extended period of the power sup-
ply. On the contrary, there are also hospitals that do not solve this problem at all 
and do not have a contractual agreement with any supplier of fuel. If necessary, 
they use their ambulances to deliver fuels in barrels from gas stations. Here, 
however, it is essential to take into account the fact that there may be a power 
failure in the whole region and there will be no possibility to use all the gas 
stations.
8. Discussion
In general, healthcare and the provision of health care in hospitals play an 
essential role for each country. The whole world is threatened by a series of events 
that may be of naturogenic or anthropogenic character. These events may result in 
a power outage. The power outage just mentioned has a significant impact on the 
hospitals. It is therefore crucial that hospitals maintain normal operations even 
during the crisis.
This chapter deals with hospital energy resilience. The relationship between 
critical infrastructure-health and power outage is mentioned. This point is dis-
cussed regarding nomenclature as well as its history and impact on hospitals. In the 
past, significant power outage impacts on hospitals could be observed.
Subsequently, a heuristic analysis of the hospital preparedness was carried out. 
This analysis was used to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses and the subsequent 
comparison of the evaluated hospitals. A total of 13 hospitals were assessed in the 
Czech Republic. Based on this analysis, we have concluded this issue. This analysis 
evaluated the different preparedness of hospitals in the field of emergency energy 
supply. Each hospital is building a different path to this issue. Therefore, it cannot 
be said that hospitals will be fully operational in the event of a crisis.
Figure 3. 
Emergency energy supply of the hospitals [author].
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Hospitals belong to the healthcare facilities whose rapid and efficient services can 
play an essential role in reducing disaster mortality rates [33]. One of the problems of 
the World Health Organization (WHO) is the disaster preparedness of hospitals [36]. 
There is still no standard and valid tool for assessing disaster preparedness in hospi-
tals [37]. Disaster managers need accurate and useful tools to assess disaster prepared-
ness for hospitals. However, there is no standardized and comprehensive instrument 
for this purpose [38]. Crisis management deals with Act No. 240 of 2000 Coll., which 
does not directly address the disaster preparedness of the hospitals. The exact number 
of hours that fuel supplies for the aggregate supply must have is not specified. There 
is only ČSN 33 2000-7-710 that was introduced for low voltage electrical installations; 
part 7–710 deals with individual purpose devices in particular premises—medical 
areas. This norm says only until when the electricity must be restored.
Based on the authors’ references and the analysis carried out, it can be stated 
that there is still no evaluation system to determine the hospital’s preparedness for 
the crisis. For these purposes, we propose to introduce a hospital evaluation system.
In the last few decades, science has called the algorithm many practical tools to 
help solve various computer problems. The algorithm is a set of rules that are typical 
of specific computer calculations or activities [39].
It is assumed that the use of this system will not only be within the hospital 
but also by the regional office. We will create a Web portal that will illustrate the 
hospitals in the region. Each hospital will fill in the data that are required to calcu-
late the length of hospital maintenance (or only selected rooms/circuits) and will be 
stored in this portal. When the power outage occurs, the expected failure interval 
will be entered. That will make it clear which hospitals are capable of managing the 
crisis without having to deliver fuel. Otherwise, the request will be sent to external 
suppliers or the regional authority (depending on the length of the power supply 
outage) for the fuel supply. All communication would then take the form of data 
sentences that would be documented. These data sentences would not only serve to 
send a request but subsequently to acknowledge the receipt of the application, to 
submit information about the resources assigned and quantity.
9. Conclusion
The aim of the chapter was to analyze the current state of the crisis prepared-
ness of the hospital. There have been an increasing number of crises not only in 
the Czech Republic but also in the world in recent years. It has an impact on the 
critical infrastructure of the country and hence on the lives, health, and property of 
citizens. Information technologies are increasingly affecting citizens’ lives and help-
ing in day-to-day activities, but also in solving the crisis. We can, therefore, see the 
multidisciplinarity of this field, which also affects the area of population protection 
and crisis management.
The central part of the chapter was an assessment of the current state. We are 
increasingly confronted with threats of naturogenic and anthropogenic character. 
These events have a direct impact, and in some cases, they also cause cascading 
effects. An example may be a windswept wind that can cause trees to fall on the 
power lines and a subsequent power outage. The impact is already on the mentioned 
critical infrastructure of the country, including, among others, the health sector. In 
the hospitals, it is necessary to supply electricity in the required range and quality. 
Based on previous research, it has been found that hospitals’ preparedness in the 
field of emergency energy supply is at a different level. Some hospitals in the Czech 
Republic are not prepared to face a long-term power outage and rely on help from 
authorities and other crisis management bodies.
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Besides, there is no comprehensive and uniform assessment system to assess the 
readiness of hospitals to face a crisis—power outage. At the end, a possible way to 
solve this situation was proposed.
The results of the research will be used as a form of information support in 
solving the crisis—power supply shortage in hospitals and also in other medical 
facilities and other facilities. In particular, the use will be linked to the needs of the 
hospital and the regional authority and any external contractors.
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